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Towards Preventing and Managing Conflict of Interest 
in Nutrition Policy? An Analysis of Submissions to a 
Consultation on a Draft WHO Tool
Rob Ralston1,2 ID , Sarah E. Hill1,2 ID , Fabio da Silva Gomes3 ID , Jeff Collin1,2* ID
Abstract
Background: With multi-stakeholder approaches central to efforts to address global health challenges, debates around 
conflict of interest (COI) are increasingly prominent. The World Health Organization (WHO) recently developed a 
proposed tool to support member states in preventing and managing COI in nutrition policy. We analysed responses to 
an online consultation to explore how actors from across sectors understand COI and the ways in which they use this 
concept to frame the terms of commercial sector engagement in health governance. 
Methods: Submissions from 44 Member States, international organisations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 
academic institutions and commercial sector actors were coded using a thematic framework informed by framing 
theory. Respondents’ orientation to the tool aligned with two broad frames, ie, a ‘collaboration and partnership’ frame 
that endorsed multi-stakeholder approaches and a ‘restricted engagement’ frame that highlighted core tensions between 
public health and food industry actors. 
Results: Responses to the WHO tool reflected contrasting conceptualisations of COI and implications for health 
governance. While most Member States, NGOs, and academic institutions strongly supported the tool, commercial 
sector organisations depicted it as inappropriate, unworkable and incompatible with the Sustainable Development Goals 
(SGDs). Commercial sector respondents advanced a narrow, individual-level understanding of COI, seen as adequately 
addressed by existing mechanisms for disclosure, and viewed the WHO tool as unduly restricting scope for private 
sector engagement in nutrition policy. In contrast, health-focused NGOs and several Member States drew on a more 
expansive understanding of COI that recognised scope for wider tensions between public health goals and commercial 
interests and associated governance challenges. These submissions mostly welcomed the tool as an innovative approach 
to preventing and managing such conflicts, although some NGOs sought broader exclusion of corporate actors from 
policy engagement.
Conclusion: Submissions on the WHO tool illustrate how contrasting positions on COI are central to understanding 
broader debates in nutrition policy and across global health governance. Effective health governance requires greater 
understanding of how COI can be conceptualised and managed amid high levels of contestation on policy engagement 
with commercial sector actors. This requires both ongoing innovation in governance tools and more extensive conceptual 
and empirical research. 
Keywords: Nutrition, Health Governance, Conflict of Interest, Commercial Sector, Global Health 
Copyright: © 2020 The Author(s); Published by Kerman University of Medical Sciences. This is an open-access article 
distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is 
properly cited.
Citation: Ralston R, Hill SE, da Silva Gomes F, Collin J. Towards preventing and managing conflict of interest in 
nutrition policy? an analysis of submissions to a consultation on a draft WHO tool. Int J Health Policy Manag. 
2020;x(x):x–x.  doi:10.34172/ijhpm.2020.52
*Correspondence to:
Jeff Collin   
Email: jeff.collin@ed.ac.uk 
Article History:
Received: 6 December 2019
Accepted: 5 April 2020
ePublished: 21 April 2020
Original Article
Full list of authors’ affiliations is available at the end of the article.
http://ijhpm.com
Int J Health Policy Manag 2020, x(x), 1–11 doi 10.34172/ijhpm.2020.52
Introduction
The increasing prominence of multi-stakeholder approaches 
in global health has highlighted potential tensions between 
public health goals and the interests of non-state partners. 
The significance of such conflicts of interest (COI) is a matter 
of particular salience in non-communicable disease (NCD) 
policy, given that NCD epidemics are substantially driven by 
unhealthy commodity industries including alcohol, tobacco 
and ultra-processed food and drink producers.1,2 In the 
context of emerging evidence about the limited effectiveness 
of public-private partnerships in global health3,4 and public 
health nutrition5-7 the extent to which states can and should 
engage with commercial and other non-state actors in efforts 
to address these epidemics has emerged as a central fault line 
in contemporary health governance.8 At a global level, the 
complex politics across this divide were recently illustrated 
by the World Health Organization’s (WHO’s) tortuous 
negotiation of its Framework for Engagement with Non-state 
Actors (FENSA), the most protracted and fractious aspect of 
the latest WHO reforms.9-11
Debates regarding terms of engagement with the food 
industry in nutrition governance are particularly complex 
and contentious.8,12,13 In 2012, the WHO’s Comprehensive 
implementation plan on maternal, infant and young child 
nutrition called on Member States to “establish a dialogue 
with relevant national and international parties and form 
Ralston et al
International Journal of Health Policy and Management, 2020, x(x), 1–112
Implications for policy makers
• Analysis of submissions across sectors highlighted significant divergence in how conflict of interest (COI) is understood, with important 
implications for nutrition governance and the roles of non-state actors.
• Commercial sector actors saw COI as effectively addressed by requirements for individual disclosure, and opposed the tool as inhibiting 
partnership approaches.
• Civil society organisations and most participating member states highlighted broader potential conflicts between food industry interests and 
public health goals, and largely viewed the tool as an important innovation in seeking to manage and prevent such tensions.
• The centrality of COI to key debates in global health governance highlights the potential contribution of the tool in promoting policy coherence 
across nutrition and non-communicable diseases (NCDs).
Implications for the public
The question of how to manage conflicts between commercial sector interests and public health goals is among the most contested in global health. 
The World Health Organization (WHO) has developed a tool to prevent and manage conflict of interest (COI) in nutrition policy, and responses across 
governments, commercial sector actors and civil society highlight major divisions in how actors understand such conflicts and their implications for 
health policy. The tool represents an important innovation in developing effective responses to the problems of obesity and under-nutrition. 
Key Messages 
alliances and partnerships to expand nutrition actions with 
the establishment of adequate mechanisms to safeguard 
against potential conflicts of interest”14 – thus situating 
nutrition policy at the centre of such debates. On one hand, 
the plan epitomises a wide-ranging commitment to public-
private partnerships and multi-stakeholder platforms as 
key mechanisms for the pursuit of health and development 
goals,15 highlighted in the call for revitalized and enhanced 
partnerships in Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 17.16 
On the other, it acknowledges scope for divergence between 
public health goals and the interests of key economic actors. 
Member States subsequently sought support from WHO 
in reconciling these contrasting imperatives in nutrition 
policy, with the 2014 World Health Assembly requesting the 
development of “risk assessment, disclosure and management 
tools to safeguard against possible conflicts of interest 
in policy development and implementation of nutrition 
programmes.”17 A process entailing a technical consultation18 
and informal working groups led to WHO publishing a ‘Draft 
approach on the prevention and management of conflicts 
of interest in the policy development and implementation 
of nutrition programmes at country level’ in 2017.19-21 This 
draft approach (hereafter ‘WHO tool’) centres on a risk 
assessment tool offering a 6-step methodology intended to 
support Member States in considering their engagement with 
non-state actors in the area of nutrition.20 While addressing 
potential risks of conflicts with a broad range of actors, the 
methodology incorporates a particular focus on commercial 
interests and assessing alignment with nutrition goals (Box 1).
The WHO tool thus constitutes a key innovation in 
managing COI in NCD governance, arguably comparable in 
significance to the commitment in Article 5.3 of the WHO 
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control to protect 
tobacco control policies from the commercial and other 
vested interests of the tobacco industry.25,26 An important 
opportunity to examine responses to the tool, and to shed 
light on the global politics of COI in nutrition policy, was 
offered by an online consultation WHO held from September 
11-29, 2017. Participants were encouraged to provide written 
feedback on the draft tool and associated introductory and 
discussion papers, with responses received from across 
Member States, inter-governmental organizations (IGOs), 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as well as from 
private sector actors. Based on analysis of these responses, 
this study aims to explore the differing ways in which COI is 
understood by diverse actors in global health debates and to 
consider the relevance of these varying conceptions to their 
appraisals of the WHO tool and their preferences regarding 
the role of commercial actors in health governance. In 
doing so, it draws on the distinction between individual and 
institutional COI used in the WHO tool (Box 1) and reflected 
in the academic literature.15,16 
Methods
WHO’s online consultation was open from September 11-
29, 2017, with respondents encouraged to provide written 
feedback on the draft tool and the associated introductory and 
discussion papers. Submissions were made by Member States,6 
UN agencies and other IGOs,5 NGOs,12 academic institutions,7 
and commercial sector actors14 (see Table 1). All submissions 
were available in English except the Member State submission 
from Colombia and a submission from the Mexican Council 
of Consumer Product Industries (CONMéxico), which were 
both in Spanish and were reviewed by one of the authors 
(FSG) for the purposes of analysis. 
This paper takes a constructivist approach, identifying the 
various ‘policy frames’ developed by actors to shape debates 
about COI. This analytical perspective focuses on how actors 
construct or interpret issues in ways that influence how 
policy problems are defined, who is considered a legitimate 
stakeholder, and possible solutions. The politically contested 
nature of health governance means that different groups 
of actors compete for their interpretation to become the 
dominant framing. Findings from public health research on 
framing27-30 suggest that commercial sector actors strategically 
use frames as a ‘weapon of advocacy’31 to promote policies 
that are aligned with their economic and political interests. 
We undertook analysis of all 44 submissions, focusing 
particularly on respondents’ framing the WHO tool, and 
ideas about COI. Each submission was reviewed by 2 authors 
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and findings from the frame analysis were used to assign the 
respondent’s overall position in relation to the tool, ie, broadly 
supportive, broadly critical, or unclear/mixed. 
Based on this approach, we identified 2 policy frames 
around which actors’ interpretations of the tool are 
structured in relation to their (i) overall orientation to the 
tool, (ii) conceptualization of COI, and (iii) concerns with 
specific elements of the tool. Table 2 provides a generalised 
representation of problem definitions and policy solutions 
used within these 2 frames. These labels delineate 2 competing 
representations evident in submissions: ie, collaboration and 
partnership frames that prioritize partnership and multi-
sectoral approaches and are sceptical about the relevance and 
appropriateness of the tool in global health governance; and 
conflict and restricted engagement frames which see nutrition 
policy as defined by core tensions between public health and (at 
least some) food industry interests and favour development of 
a powerful tool to address perceived inadequacies of existing 
governance arrangements in managing COI.
Results
While all 44 respondents stated their general agreement in 
principle with a need to address COI, submissions varied 
significantly in their support for a WHO-produced tool 
to address COI in nutrition policy (Table 1). The tool was 
widely supported by Member States, many NGOs, and 
academic institutions. Commercial sector entities were all 
highly critical, as was the Member State submission from 
In September 2017, WHO released an introductory paper,19 
discussion paper,20 and a proposed decision-making process 
and tool21 describing its ‘Draft approach on the prevention and 
management of conflicts of interest in the policy development and 
implementation of nutrition programmes at country level.’ (Final 
versions of these documents were subsequently presented to the 
WHO Executive Board and the World Health Assembly in 2018,22-24 
with the discussion paper retitled as a ‘Report by the Director 
General’). These documents outline the purpose, principles and 
key elements of the tool, which takes the (non-binding) form 
of guidance to Member States to be used at their discretion in 
supporting the development of nutrition policy. The primary focus 
of the tool is to protect Member State’s goals in relation to nutrition 
policy, with broader health and other government goals considered 
as part of the wider context.
Purpose of Tool
•	 The tool is intended to guide Member States “in their 
engagement with non-State actors and institutions (‘external 
actors’)… in the development, design, and implementation of 
public health nutrition policies and programmes.”22 In other 
words, it is designed for internal use by Member States, where 
nutrition teams (within national Ministries of Health) are 
assessing whether or not to collaborate with external actors in 
their nutrition policies and programmes.
•	 It was developed following a request from Member States for 
WHO to develop tools that would help them manage potential 
conflicts of interest in engaging with external actors in pursuit 
of population nutrition goals.17
Key Concepts and Principles
•	 WHO defines COI as a situation “where there is potential 
for a secondary interest (a vested interest in the outcome 
of the government’s work in the area of nutrition) to unduly 
influence … either the independence or objectivity of 
professional judgement or actions regarding a primary interest 
(related to the government’s work).”22
•	 The introductory paper distinguishes between individual and 
institutional COIs, where individual COI refers to “a private 
interest (financial, personal, or other non-governmental interest 
or commitment)” that might interfere with the government’s 
public health nutrition goals, while institutional COI describes 
“situations where the interest of non-State institutions… in 
particular economic, commercial or financial, are not aligned 
with the government’s public health policies.”22
•	 The documents describe the goal of policy coherence as a key 
principle with relevance to the WHO tool. In this context, policy 
coherence refers to the extent to which policies across different 
government sectors (ie, across Health and other Ministries) are 
aligned or coordinated.22
•	 Other principles underpinning the tool include the need to 
ensure that engagement between governments and external 
actors are appropriate (ie, will not undermine nutrition goals), 
government-led (ie, the government sets the parameters of the 
collaboration), and that adequate internal mechanisms are in 
place to ensure accountability and transparency in the Ministry’s 
engagement with the external actor.22 
Six-Step Decision-Making Process
•	 The tool sets out a 6-step process via which Member States 
assess the appropriateness of a proposal collaboration with an 
external actor, and (if the collaboration goes ahead) establish 
appropriate parameters and mechanism to ensure any potential 
COIs are identified and managed.24
•	 The tool is intended for use by a decision-making unit within 
the Ministry of Health, which gathers relevant information 
and undertakes due diligence on the external actor; assesses 
the relevant elements of the proposed collaboration; makes 
an assessment about the relative risks and benefits of the 
collaboration; proposes terms of reference for the collaboration; 
and recommends measures to manage any potential COI.24
•	 Steps 1-3 focus on assessing the appropriateness of a proposed 
collaboration. Depending on the profile of the external actor, 
the rationale for the proposed engagement, and the balance 
of risks and benefits, a recommendation is made regarding 
whether or not to proceed with the collaboration.
•	 Where the proposed collaboration is deemed appropriate, 
steps 4-6 of the tool provide a framework for establishing the 
parameters of the collaboration and establishing appropriate 
measures to ensure accountability and transparency. These 
measures are intended to support ongoing assessment of the 
collaboration, with the option that the Member State may 
withdraw at any point if the engagement is no longer deemed 
appropriate with respect to the government’s nutrition goals. 
Abbreviations: COI, conflict of interest; WHO, World Health 
Organization.
Box 1. Key Elements of the WHO Draft Approach (“WHO Tool”) for Prevention and Management of COI in Nutrition Policy
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the United States and that from the Secretariat of the Scaling 
Up Nutrition (SUN) partnership. From a very different 
perspective, a small number of NGOs saw the WHO tool 
as incapable of addressing the challenge of preventing COI, 
while 5 submissions did not exhibit a clear overall position 
on it (Figure).
Policy Frames
Collaboration and Partnership
A ‘collaboration and partnership’ frame was consistently 
articulated across submissions made by commercial sector 
actors, by the Member State submission from the United 
States, and by the Secretariat of the SUN partnership, all 
of whom used the consultation to undertake an extensive 
critique of the tool. This strategic framing was strongly 
critical of the draft tool as exclusionary and distrustful in its 
attention to the commercial sector; consistently rejected any 
comparison between food and tobacco industries or scope 
for lesson learning from practice in tobacco control; viewed 
the tool’s recommendations as inconsistent with principles 
of good governance, and particularly with the SDG agenda; 
and presented COI as being both compatible with extensive 
engagement and as being satisfactorily addressed by existing 
practices. 
Using identical phrasing, both the Italian Food and Drink 
Federation and the Private Sector Mechanism to the UN 
Committee on Food Security (CFS) critiqued the language of 
the document as revealing “categorical and unhelpful distrust 
of any private sector actor” and as “denigrating industry.”32 In 
similar vein, Food Industry Asia called on WHO to reconsider 
its proposals, “especially those that are designed to shut out 
the private sector from any meaningful policy discussion,”33 
while the submission from the US government noted: 
Table 1. Respondents to the WHO Consultation by Overall Position (Supportive, 
Critical or Unclear) and Actor Type
Supportive of WHO Tool
Member States
Brazil
Canada
Colombia
Namibia
UN agencies and other IGOs
UN Network for SUN Secretariat*
WFP
NGOs
Consumer Council of Fiji
FHI360/Alive and Thrive Southeast Asia
Healthy Food Alliance, Brazil
Healthy Latin America Coalition
The Cochrane Collaboration, United Kingdom
UK Health Forum, United Kingdom
European Public Health Alliance
Third World Network
Academic institutions
Academia Española de Nutrición Humana y Dietética, Spain
NNEdPro Global Centre for Nutrition and Health, United Kingdom
Niger Delta University, Nigeria
Deakin University, Australia
University of Cambridge, United Kingdom
University of Sydney, Australia
National Institute for Health and Welfare, Finland
Critical of WHO Tool
Member States
The United States 
UN agencies and other IGOs
SUN Secretariat*
NGOs
Geneva Infant Feeding Association, Switzerland
International Baby Food Action Network
World Public Health Nutrition Association
Commercial sector entities
AFH, the United States 
CONMéxico, Mexico
EAGL, the United States 
FIA
Global Dairy Platform, United States of America
GMA, the United States
Council for International Business, the United States
International Council of Beverages Associations
International Special Dietary Foods Industries
Private Sector Mechanism of the CFS
IDF
International Council of Beverages Associations
Federalimentare - Italian Food & Drink Industry Federation, Italy
Nutrispectives, LLC, the United States 
Position Unclear/Mixed
Member States
New Zealand
UN agencies and other IGOs
OECD
UNDP
NGOs
Centre for Health Science and Law, Canada
Academic institutions
NNEdPro Global Centre for Nutrition and Health, United Kingdom
Abbreviations: WHO, World Health Organization; SUN, Scaling Up Nutrition; 
WFP, World Food Programme; NGO, non-governmental organization; AFH, 
Alliance for Food & Health; CONMéxico, Consejo Mexicano de la Industria 
de Productos de Consumo; EAGL, Engaging America’s Global Leadership; 
FIA, Food Industry Asia; GMA, Grocery Manufacturers Association; CFS, 
Committee on Food Security; IDF, International Dairy Federation; UNDP, 
United Nations Development Programme, OECD, Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development; IGOs, inter-governmental organizations
a Note that contrasting submissions were made by two different actors 
affiliated to the SUN partnership, namely the UN Network for SUN 
Secretariat and the SUN Secretariat.
Table 1. Continued
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“We are deeply concerned by the overarching tone of 
exclusion present in the draft documents, which runs directly 
counter to the current global approach of inclusiveness and 
recognition of the need for all stakeholders to work together 
to achieve global nutrition goals.”34
This concern also entailed a rejection of lesson drawing 
from experiences in managing COI within tobacco control. 
For the US government, “blanket consideration of the food 
and beverage sector in the same manner as the tobacco 
industry is inappropriate,”34 the Private Sector Mechanism 
to the CFS rejects “inappropriate comparisons between the 
food and beverage industries and the tobacco industry,”32 
comparisons which the Italian Food and Drink Federation 
further regards as “unacceptable.”35
More broadly, submissions using the ‘collaboration and 
partnership’ frame presented the tool’s potential constraints 
on private sector engagement as incompatible with established 
norms of good governance, including within WHO and 
particularly across the SDG agenda. This centred on the claim 
that the draft tool diverged markedly from the stated intention 
of ensuring consistency with “WHO’s overall policies and 
practices,”20 with submissions from Food Industry Asia and 
the International Food and Beverage Alliance strategically 
positioning the tool as counter to the “spirit” of FENSA 
negotiations.33,36 The Grocery Manufacturers Association 
(GMA) contended that “no tool recommended by the 
WHO should have exclusionary criteria […] which are not 
consistent with FENSA.”37 This framing is also evident in the 
United States submission, which notes:
“Problematic language […] in the proposed decision-
Table 2. Policy Frames, Definitions and Solutions in Submissions to the WHO Consultation
Policy Frame Problem Definition Policy Solution
Collaboration and 
partnership
Draft WHO tool identified as incompatible with 
commitments to partnership and multi-stakeholder 
approaches in SDG agenda
COI seen as minimal, applying equally across all non-state 
actors and as being adequately managed by existing practices  
Conflict and restricted 
engagement
Nutrition policy characterised by tensions between public 
health goals and economic interests
COI concerns focus on more effectively managing and 
delineating terms of engagement with commercial sector 
actors. WHO tool should address institutional and/or structural 
conflicts of interest
Abbreviations: WHO, World Health Organization; SDG, Sustainable Development Goal; COI, conflict of interest.
making process and tool advising where “great caution” 
should be exercised. FENSA states WHO will exercise 
“particular caution” when engaging with private sector 
entities.”34
Private sector actors frequently invoked a claimed 
disjuncture between the tool’s cautious approach to 
engagement with the private sector and the UN commitment 
to multi-sectoral and partnership approaches as preferred 
mechanisms for advancing the SDGs. Indeed, commercial 
sector actors accounted for over 85% of the total number of 
references to the SDGs across all submissions. Their problem 
definition focused on perceived challenges to the effectiveness 
and accountability of health governance, portraying the tool 
as frustrating the potential of partnerships with the private 
sector in achieving goals across nutrition, global health and 
sustainable development: 
International Council of Beverages Associations: “The 
theme contained in these documents – namely, that the 
input of the private sector on topics related to nutrition 
policies is not only unwelcome but should be subject to near-
automatic exclusion […] stands in contrast to high-level 
global engagement approach [sic] endorsed elsewhere […] 
This exclusion runs counter to the approach endorsed by the 
UN General Assembly in its pursuit of the SDGs.”38 
Alliance for Food and Health: “These documents raise 
concerns that Member States may significantly restrict 
engagement with one of the non-State [sic] actors: the private 
sector. […] Restricted engagement appears contradictory 
to SDG 17; specifically it can weaken attempts to provide 
sustainable solutions to the NCD crisis by excluding a key 
stakeholder group.”39 
This assertion of the value of extensive private sector 
engagement in nutrition policy is coupled with a rejection 
of any claim that intrinsic tensions or distinctive issues 
are entailed by their participation. The Private Sector 
Mechanism to the CFS noted that “(c)ommercial motives 
are not incompatible with public health interests,”32 a point 
phrased as “not inherently incompatible” by the Italian Food 
and Drink Federation,35 while several submissions shifted 
focus towards conflicts of interest they identified among 
other non-state actors. Food Industry Asia and the US-
based GMA identically argued that relevant questions for 
assessing conflicts “relate not to an actor’s sector but rather 
to the transparent management of inputs and outcomes 
in policy considerations.”33,37 In extending attention to 
conflicts beyond the private sector, the International Dairy 
Figure. Numbers of Supportive, Critical and Unclear Responses to the WHO 
Consultation, by Actor Type. Abbreviation: WHO, World Health Organization.
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Federation note that “(s)ources of bias are extensive and 
complex” and cite “many types of bias including cognitive, 
financial, publication, statistical, political, ethical, 
philosophical, etc”40; the Global Dairy Platform similarly 
contend that “statements in publications, history of unpaid 
advisory roles, and organisational affiliations” may be as 
significant as financial interests.41 
The International Dairy Federation is the only private 
sector actor to explicitly include a definition of COI in its 
submission, citing a 2009 Institute of Medicine report42 to 
which it attributes the designation, echoing Thompson,43 of “a 
risk that professional judgment or actions regarding a primary 
interest will be unduly influenced by a secondary interest.”40 
More broadly, the literature cited in these submissions 
contesting the tool’s handling of COI reaffirms the emphasis 
on individual level concerns alongside extending the range of 
relevant conflicts beyond the private sector. The Global Dairy 
Platform cites a paper that uses the term “white hat bias” to 
describe a tendency among health-oriented researchers to 
distort “research-based information in the service of what 
may be perceived as righteous ends.”41 The Alliance for Food 
and Health39 cites a paper by Rowe et al for the Conflict of 
Interest Working Group of the International Life Sciences 
Institute North America (a food industry founded and 
led organization) on criteria for selecting participants for 
expert advisory committees.44 Principles developed by the 
International Life Sciences Institute working group also 
formed the basis of a report on addressing COI in nutrition 
research45 cited by both the Global Dairy Platform and the 
International Dairy Federation.40,41 
The preferred policy solutions associated with such 
perspectives centre on positioning COI as a legitimate 
but marginal concern that can be effectively addressed by 
established practices regarding disclosure. The International 
Dairy Federation contends that “simply being aware of the 
interests of the [non-state actor] can ensure any inappropriate 
input … would be more easily recognizable,”40 while the GMA 
suggest that “transparent disclosure standards and clear, 
equitable processes can identify, manage and resolve potential 
conflicts of interest appropriately.”37
This perception of challenges posed by COI as being 
peripheral and manageable is linked to the assertion that 
the identification of COI should not narrow the scope of 
engagement by commercial actors in nutrition policy. The 
Italian Food and Drink Federation and the Private Sector 
Mechanism to the CFS both argue that it “is unfair to allow a 
perception of COI to affect decisions on whether to continue 
to engage with a particular private sector actor,”32,35 while 
the Alliance for Food and Health suggest that governance 
mechanisms to identify interests and objectives “should serve 
as a mechanism to enable, rather than prohibit, partnerships 
with non-State actors,”39 with identical phrasing being used by 
the SUN secretariat.46 The emphasis on the appropriate aim 
of COI tools as being to promote and enable participation 
rather than restricting engagement is similarly evident in the 
submission from the US government:
“Issues around actual COIs should begin with an intention 
to bring in stakeholders to work towards common public 
health goals. COI mitigation and management tools, such 
as Codes of Conduct, can be used to increase transparency 
and reduce risk around actual COIs while promote successful 
multi-stakeholder partnerships.”34
Overall, it is clear that proponents of the ‘collaboration and 
partnership’ frame consistently reject the idea that tensions 
exist between the interests of commercial sector actors and 
public health, and, therefore, that new mechanisms would be 
required to address COI. Reflecting this, problem definitions 
emphasize a claimed dysfunctionality of the proposed tool 
within the wider development agenda, which are then 
combined with policy solutions that divert attention from 
corporate actors. 
Conflict and Restricted Engagement
In contrast, proponents of a ‘conflict and restricted 
engagement’ frame, consisting of several Member States, 
the majority of participating NGOs, and most academic 
institutions, perceived the draft WHO tool as offering 
a potentially important step in strengthening nutrition 
governance by addressing COI. This positive appraisal is 
apparent in several actors’ assessments of the decision-
making tool, where problem definitions associated with 
this frame include a particular focus on tensions between 
commercial interests and public health goals. Recognition of 
such tensions is central to support for the tool as articulated in 
the submissions from Brazil, Colombia and Namibia: 
Brazil: [T]he document under online consultation should 
consider … potential conflicts of interest and forms of control 
regarding different non-governmental actors participation, 
particularly food industries and the organizations financed 
by them. The document should be sensitive to immediate 
strategies or interventions, based on infant formulas, 
fortified foods and micronutrient supplements distribution 
(often disassociated from the local food culture and habits 
and provided by the companies that manufacture these 
products, ie direct COIs with the interventions and possible 
alternatives).47
The submission by Colombia also emphasized such conflicts 
as impacting on public health, citing marketing of breast-milk 
substitutes, sports sponsorship by soda companies, and the 
revolving door via which government officials later take up 
positions in the food industry.48 Namibia’s Minister of Health 
and Social similarly described nutrition marketing as one of 
the “concealed battle fields as far as commercial interest[s] 
are concerned,” with a tendency for such interests to “always 
end up being the winner.” This highlighted the importance 
of WHO guidance “to ensure that the public and mostly the 
vulnerable are protected at all times against COI” including 
by actors that collaborate with WHO.49 
Several submissions deploying a ‘conflict’ frame - including 
those from Canada, OECD, UN Development Programme 
and the Centre for Health Science and Law50-52 – understood 
COI in more institutional terms – that is, as a potential 
conflict between the primary interest of an organisation or 
collaboration (such as promoting healthy nutrition) and its 
secondary interests (such as securing financial support). 
Some actors also questioned the clarity of the documents in 
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defining and presenting COI; comments from a professor at 
the University of Sydney suggest that the documents “confuse 
COI with bias,”53 while the International Baby Foods Action 
Network (IBFAN) suggest that draft documents “produce an 
incorrect understanding of what COI regulation is.”54 Yet, 
although it is clear that COI was conceptualized in varying 
ways, these organisations shared a broad recognition of such 
conflict as constituting a significant problem for global heath 
governance, and one that centred on a perceived need to 
address tensions between commercial sector interests and 
public health goals. While acknowledging that COI could 
arise for any actors engaged in the policy process, the Healthy 
Latin America Coalition epitomised a widely held (if varyingly 
expressed) emphasis on issues associated with private sector 
engagement in nutrition policy:
“While COI might emanate from many different sectors, 
including government agencies, the significant role of the 
ultraprocessed food and beverage industry, and its front 
groups, is such that it might require special treatment in this 
proposed process.”55
Food researchers from the University of Cambridge 
welcomed the tool’s assertion of the primary authority of 
national governments to develop nutrition policy “and the 
clarification that while private sector stakeholders can be 
consulted in meetings, they should be excluded from actual 
decision-making because of the potential COI.”56
Several submissions from NGOs sought to move beyond 
institutional understandings of COI. This is most explicit in 
Healthy Food Alliance Brazil calling for the tool to “develop 
a broader recognition of systemic or structural COI.”44 This 
noted that institutional approaches to managing COI “are 
often specified very narrowly with respect to the activities of 
a specific engagement or partnership, and can ignore wider 
tensions across other spheres of public health,” citing the 
example of the Global Fund’s justification of a partnership 
with a leading brewery.44 
More broadly, the perception of nutrition policy as being 
characterised by intrinsic or fundamental conflicts between 
key private sector actors and health goals is strongly evident in 
several submissions from health-oriented NGOs, exemplified 
by the European Public Health Alliance:
[T]he paper and tool addresses issues that the European 
Public Health Alliance and public health researchers and 
organisations have long identified; that there is an inherent 
COI for producers of health-harmful products, including food 
and drink products, which incentivises them to intervene in 
policy making with the aim to derail and delay public interest 
policies, programmes and measures.57
While all respondents employing the ‘conflict’ frame 
were supportive of the intent of the draft tool, some groups 
did raise concerns about its ability to reconcile effectively 
addressing COI with commitments to partnerships and 
multi-stakeholder approaches. In arguing for an extension 
to producers of unhealthy food and drinks of the type of 
exclusionary approach that WHO adopts with the tobacco 
industry, the World Public Health Nutrition Association 
contend:
The text reflects a contradiction between an effort to 
safeguard policy and programming endeavours in nutrition 
and a simultaneous reaffirmation of flawed multi-stakeholder 
and public-private partnerships initiatives… [that] have COI 
intrinsically built- into them that go against decision-making 
in the public interest.58
In similar vein, IBFAN suggest that the draft documents 
fail to address the risks of partnership and multi-stakeholder 
approaches that “blur the lines between public and private and 
create difficulties for national governments when attempting 
to protect citizens from undue influence.”54 The Geneva Infant 
Food Association extends this critique of WHO’s proposed 
approach as “[r]edefining of the COI concept to serve the 
[multi-stakeholder initiative/partnership] paradigm.”59
Discussion
Analysis of submissions on the WHO tool for managing COI 
in nutrition policy suggests respondents drew on a range of 
conceptualisations of COI, ranging from more individualised 
framings (reflected in many commercial sector submissions) 
to more structural understandings (most evident in 
submissions from several health-oriented NGOs). While 
variation is evident within broad groups of respondents, some 
key themes emerge from this analysis. These serve to highlight 
the centrality of competing conceptions of COI to debates 
regarding nutrition policy and global health governance, 
and in particular to defining the terms and parameters of 
appropriate engagement with non-state actors amid concerns 
about the effectiveness of partnership approaches.3-7 
The extent to which respondents supported the WHO 
tool was closely linked with how they conceptualized COI. 
The diverse range of actors who were generally supportive 
of the tool typically advanced a broad understanding of 
COI, albeit with some implicit or explicit variation across 
institutional and structural conceptions. In contrast, 
participating organisations who largely rejected the draft tool 
as inappropriate or unhelpful, notably comprising all of the 
submissions from commercial actors, often invoked a more 
individualised understanding of COI. The latter typically 
presented conflicts as being of limited significance, as 
adequately addressed by existing widespread practices such as 
disclosure, and therefore questioned the legitimacy or value 
of the proposed tool. 
Crucially, the ways in which respondents framed COI 
in nutrition policy is closely linked to their organisation’s 
preferences in relation to the role of commercial actors 
in health governance. The analysis of these submissions, 
therefore, captures key tensions within contemporary health 
governance, ones that are experienced particularly acutely in 
nutrition policy. Importantly, the analysis highlights the policy 
salience of debates around COI, and indicates how advancing 
such debates might inform efforts to address wider fault-lines 
in global health and sustainable development. Analysis of the 
submissions illustrates the challenges confronting the WHO 
tool given the polarisation of perspectives across participating 
organisations, and the high levels of contestation surrounding 
the very concept of COI. Yet the very centrality of COI 
to broader debates in health governance also highlights 
powerful opportunities associated with this innovative new 
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instrument as a route towards promoting policy coherence 
in nutrition and NCD policies (ie, in pursuing increased 
alignment and coordination of policies across different areas 
of health governance, and between health and other state 
sectors). Leveraging such opportunities will require that 
approaches to applying the tool be adaptive, enabling its 
further development to build support, encourage uptake, and 
ensure that it is responsive to diverse national contexts. 
Discussing the submissions with reference to contrasting 
‘Collaboration and partnership’ and ’Conflict and restricted 
engagement’ frames highlights the substantive divergence 
across both problem definition and policy solutions. 
Commercial sector submissions to the online consultation, 
along with those of the United States and the SUN Secretariat, 
saw relevant COIs as being distributed across all actors, 
rejecting the idea that there was anything particularly different 
or significant about such conflicts in relation to commercial 
actors, and, in particular, any suggestion that such conflicts 
should circumscribe the terms of their participation in 
nutrition policy. This position buttressed the presentation of 
commercial organisations as legitimate and necessary actors 
within global health governance, with their claim to central 
roles in efforts to advance to nutrition, global health and 
sustainable development presented as endorsed by the UN in 
the SDGs and by WHO via FENSA. 
In contrast, many NGOs and most Member States 
presented efforts to manage COI with commercial actors 
as essential to the development of effective nutrition policy. 
These submissions typically presented the interests of many 
commercial producers as intrinsically conflicting with public 
health goals, thus necessitating the development of clear 
and detailed guidelines for limiting engagement with (or 
excluding such actors from participation in) nutrition policy. 
This polarised divide with respect to COI in nutrition policy 
closely mirrors debates about the terms of engagement of 
non-state actors in health policy more broadly, notably in 
the protracted and contentious negotiations within WHO in 
developing FENSA.9-11
In delineating the different ways in which COI is presented 
and understood across these submissions, the account 
presented here demonstrates the high levels of contestation 
to which this concept is subject. While the wider literature 
has recognised the ambiguity and malleability of COI,60 
this analysis of the online consultation demonstrates that 
the variation across individual, institutional and structural 
understandings has substantive policy significance. Variation 
in problem definition, or in how COI is understood, 
corresponds in large part with preferred policy solutions 
regarding whether and how key commercial sector actors 
should be engaged in nutrition policy at Member State level.
A further significant, if largely latent, element of 
contestation is exposed via perspectives on the tool’s aims in 
both preventing and managing COI in nutrition programmes 
at country level. Here there are important differences 
in positions articulated across civil society submissions, 
partially cutting across the polarity of the divide between 
‘collaboration’ and ‘conflict’ frames. Those NGOs who are 
most sceptical about the likely effectiveness of the WHO tool, 
namely IBFAN, Geneva Infant Food Association, and World 
Public Health Nutrition Association, do so on the basis of a 
fundamental rejection of the legitimacy or efficacy of multi-
stakeholder and partnership governance models; prevention 
of COI is viewed here as requiring the complete exclusion of 
commercial sector actors from policy-making, along lines 
comparable to tobacco control, with the aim of ‘managing’ 
COI in relation to industry engagement presented as naïve or 
contradictory. 
The task of both preventing and managing COI in nutrition 
policy encapsulates the dynamics of the wider policy 
context in which the tool was developed. By contrast with 
the exclusionary politics of the Framework Convention on 
Tobacco Control, predicated on an unequivocal identification 
of incompatibility between health goals and tobacco industry 
interests,19 the WHO tool is explicitly charged with the 
task of pro-actively identifying and addressing tensions in 
multi-stakeholder and partnership approaches to nutrition. 
It represents an attempt to advance the development of 
“alliances and partnerships” via the “the establishment of 
adequate mechanisms to safeguard against potential conflicts 
of interest.”3 Thus, some civil society critics dismiss the tool as 
legitimating public-private partnerships; while – conversely 
- commercial sector submissions view the tool as hostile to 
their engagement and as incompatible with the SDG agenda 
and Goal 17. The majority of submissions, however, clearly 
welcomed the draft tool as an attempt to begin to ‘square the 
circle’ inherent in commitments to multi-sectoral approaches 
in nutrition policy, recognising tensions between health goals 
and the economic interests of the global food and drinks 
industry. Rather than being incompatible with SDG 17, the 
draft tool can therefore be seen as an important innovation 
in seeking to enhance policy coherence for sustainable 
development,61 recognising that the SDG agenda provides 
scope for regulation of the commercial determinants of 
health.62 
The highly contested politics of COI and the terms of 
engagement with commercial actors in nutrition policy 
inevitably shape the contours of the WHO tool and the context 
of its further development and potential implementation 
by Member States. When the tool was presented to the 
Executive Board in January 2018, it was presented as “a living 
document to be revised according to Member States’ needs 
and the evolution of engagement with external actors.”63 A 
subsequent informal technical consultation with Member 
States highlighted ongoing substantive variation in their 
perceived needs and preferences for participation with the 
private sector and food industry.64 While some states had 
chosen to restrict such interactions in the development of 
national nutrition guidelines, this had been operationalised in 
varying ways, while others expressed concern about whether 
implementation of the tool would jeopardise any engagement 
with the private sector.
Member States clearly recognise the need for further 
evolution of the WHO tool to enhance their ability to navigate 
such complexity, with suggested amendments including the 
development of a simplified version of the tool as an initial 
scoping device; clarification of criteria for exclusion and 
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participation; more specific guidance for managing COI in 
the context of partnerships; and wider technical assistance to 
enhance governmental capacity in this sphere.64
A key limitation of our study is that data are limited to 
those actors that responded to WHO’s online consultation, 
which took place over a very short time-frame (September 
1-29, 2017); thus we do not have access to the views of 
those countries or organizations that did not submit written 
responses. Of 55 responses, 14 came from commercial 
actors, 12 from NGOs, 8 from academic institutions, and just 
6 from Member States (with a further 5 from UN or other 
international agencies) – suggesting some sets of actors are 
better represented in these submissions than others. This 
should be borne in mind when interpreting count-based data 
(eg, Figure), which should not be interpreted as representation 
of the views of all relevant actors (indeed, our data are likely 
skewed by the large proportion of submissions coming from 
commercial actors). The extent to which relevant actors 
respond to such consultations depends in part on capacity and 
available resources, which are particularly limited for low- and 
lower-middle income countries. This may explain why – of 6 
Member State responses – 3 were from high-income and 3 
from upper-middle income countries, with no responses from 
lower or lower-middle income countries.65 We also note that 
the consultation documents were available only in English, 
which is likely to have presented an additional barrier to 
participation from Member States and other actors in regions 
where English is less commonly used. A more comprehensive 
assessment of the response of (in particular) Member States 
to the WHO tool would ideally draw on other data sources 
(including participation in Member State consultations and 
technical meetings hosted by the WHO).18,64 
Conclusion
The WHO tool for preventing and managing COI in 
nutrition policy represents an important innovation in global 
health governance, offering a framework for assessing and 
managing potential conflicts between public health goals 
and the interests of the commercial sector and other external 
actors. This is an important development in global health, 
demonstrating how consideration of COI can be incorporated 
in NCD governance beyond tobacco control, and offering 
Member States support and guidance in safeguarding their 
nutrition goals in the context of engagement with non-State 
actors. 
Realising the potential of the WHO tool will require a 
strategic approach to learning lessons from efforts to test 
its applicability across diverse country contexts, building on 
the initial experience of Brazil.66 There is also a clear need 
to strengthen research to more effectively support such a 
process, highlighted by the contestation and confusion of 
concepts that characterize the submissions analysed here. 
Analyses of efforts to implement the WHO tool could also 
address the dearth of empirical studies of initiatives to prevent 
and/or manage conflicts of interest in health policy contexts.67 
Submissions on the WHO tool also illustrate how 
contrasting positions on COI are central to understanding 
broader debates around the role of commercial sector actors 
in nutrition policy and across global health. These debates 
are often dominated by somewhat crude binary categories 
of partnership with or exclusion of commercial entities; 
governance innovations such as the tool offer the potential 
to move past a blanket acceptance or rejection of partnership 
to identify specific actors and forms of engagement where 
conflicts of interest can be managed in ways that protect 
public health nutrition goals.68 In this context, the tool may 
offer a useful reference point for Member States, officials 
and policy-makers who are concerned to prevent pursuing 
collaborations which they view as inconsistent with their 
nutrition goals. This may be particularly helpful amid broad 
pressures from within and beyond governments to pursue 
partnerships or to accept offered funds or support. Central 
to the task of defining appropriate terms of engagement with 
the private sector in nutrition policy is the need to better 
differentiate between actors within the ‘food industry,’ an 
unhelpfully sweeping category that groups together such 
diverse entities as community-based farming cooperatives 
and multi-national companies, thus obstructing attempts to 
differentiate between those actors whose economic interests 
can and cannot be substantively reconciled or aligned with 
public health goals.23 There is also a pressing need for the 
development of a more detailed typology of COI that can be 
operationalised and applied in diverse policy contexts.
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